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Iran’s
2003 Grand Bargain Offer: Secrets, Lies, and Manipulation
Hassan Dai
- 12/19/2007
In the past year, Iran has emerged as the main concern for
United States foreign policy. In the aftermath of Iraq war,
the United States is blamed for not pursuing diplomatic
means in dealing with Iran. Much is said and written about
the lost opportunity of dialogue and settling differences
with Iran in 2003.
The “grand bargain” offered by Iran and rejected by US, The
missed opportunity to resolve the nuclear impasse. The
prospect to coexist with the theocratic regime of Iran. The
chance to bring stability to Iraq and peace to the Middle
East.
While there have been a large number of articles about the
US’s disregard toward the Iranian offer, a thorough
examination of Iranian intentions and the possibility of a
manipulative misinformation campaign led by Tehran has been
conspicuously absent. This study is highly needed at a time
when the new NIE on Iran has been released and questions are
being raised about the Iranian regime's behavior in 2003.
The purpose of this article is to study the 2003 “Iranian
offer,” the motives behind it, its main players, and its
outcomes. It will be attempted to show how this “offer” was
a masterful deception technique by Tehran’s rulers who
needed to buy time to facilitate the internal shift of
power, to advance their nuclear technologies, and to
strengthen their foothold in the region.
Tehran’s ploy was a well kept secrete plan, conceived by a
handful of the highest-ranking Iranian leaders, implemented
by Sadegh Kharazi- the Iranian ambassador to France, Bob Ney
(former Congressman and current federal prisoner), and his
Iranian assistant Trita Parsi. The plan was complex;
unraveling it sounds like a mystery novel. To understand it,
the Iranian party-line story needs to be studied, the
version the Iranian lobby in the US has been tenaciously
reciting: the grand bargain. The article will then proceed
with examining the missing links in Tehran’s tale in search
of a true account of what went on behind the curtain.
It is to be revealed that the characters of this scheme have
assisted Tehran’s ayatollahs in buying time towards
advancing their malicious hegemony in the region. The
profound consequences of this grand ploy range from innocent
lives lost in Iraq, to confusion within US foreign policy
and the real possibility of an ugly and disastrous war with
Iran.
Tehran’s
Motives
Between
2002 and 2003, Iran’s ayatollahs were faced with serious
challenges and priceless opportunities. Confronted with
increasing popular discontent and paralysis of the political
system due to the continued factional divergences, the
clerical regime was in the middle of a power shift towards
the more unified, militant, and conservative faction that
Ahmadinejad represents.
With the fall of two unfriendly neighboring regimes,
Tehran’s theocratic regime sensed the opportunity to expand
its ideological, political, and military hegemony in the
region. On the other hand, the US military presence
surrounding Iran and the disclosure of the Iranian nuclear
program and its subsequent referral to the UN, were major
threats to the Iranian regime’s strategic ambitions.
To fend the perils and seize the opportunities, Tehran
desperately needed to buy time; hence a sophisticated
misinformation campaign in the US, which started with the
grand bargain offer of 2003.
The
Facade: Tehran’s Party-Line Story
In April
of 2003, the Iranian regime extended an olive branch to the
United States. The highest-ranking leaders of the theocratic
regime developed a proposal for dialogue, peace and
friendship between the two countries. Sadegh Kharazi, the
Iranian ambassador to France asked Tom Guldiman, the Swiss
ambassador in Tehran, to take the proposal, known as “Iran’s
Grand Bargain Proposal” to US leaders. 1 Accompanied with a
short memo written by Guldiman, the one page proposal 2 was
faxed to the State Department on May 4th, 2003. A few days
later, Ambassador Guldiman came to Washington to deliver the
proposal personally. 3
The affair remained undisclosed for 3 years until early
2006, when international pressure over Iran’s nuclear issue
was mounting on Iran; Trita Parsi released a new copy of the
Iranian offer to the press.4 According to Parsi, in 2003,
the Iranian regime was determined to initiate a dialogue
with the United States to resolve all the outstanding issues
between the two countries, but an arrogant US government,
judging that Iran was at the verge of collapsing, killed the
opportunity: 5
"In May
2003. The United States had just defeated Saddam in less
than three weeks, and I think there were a lot of feelings
inside Iran that they needed to present some sort of a
negotiation deal with the United States…
Iranians were basically offering significant policy
modifications in the hope that this would be able to open up
a new chapter in the relationship with the United States,
when the United States,
And the argument by the hardliners, the hawks in the
Washington -- in the White House at the time was basically
that Iran is weak and it’s giving this proposal precisely
because of the fact that it is fearful of the United States
and that the US can achieve more by taking on the Iranian
regime and just removing it than by negotiating. So we had
this situation in which, back then, because of America's
strength, the Bush administration argued that it could not
negotiate… What was really interesting is that when the
Iranians put this on the table and they were basically
offering significant policy modifications in the hope that
this would be able to open up a new chapter in the
relationship with the United States.”
Ongoing
Negotiations in 2003
Parsi’s
numerous declarations are all missing one element: when the
Swiss ambassador came to Washington to deliver the Iranian
offer, there were already secret but official negotiations
going on between the two countries, led by high ranking
Iranian diplomats. The Iranian foreign minister and the
ambassador to the UN were personally involved. The
chronology of these negotiations was reported in the New
York Times: 6
“On May
3rd, Ambassador Zarif (Iranian ambassador to the UN) meets
Ambassador Zalmy Khalilzad and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in
Geneva. The US delegation is headed by Dr. Khalilzad. The US
has already invaded Iraq and is in control of its
Government.”
During the May 3rd meeting, the two countries agreed on
another meeting on May 24th in Geneva. Meanwhile, these
official negotiations ceased for another reason: 6-7
“During
the May 3rd meeting, Khalilzad tells Zarif that the US has
learned that a terrorist bombing incident is planned to
happen in the Persian Gulf area. He asks that Iranian
Government utilize members of Al-Qaeda in Iranian prisons
for information on the planned incident. The incident
happened on May 12 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.”
The US blamed the terrorists operating from Tehran and did
not show up for the next meeting on May 24th.
Role of
Bob Ney and Trita Parsi in the “Grand Bargain”
In early
May, Guldimann, who was not involved in the official
negotiations, arrived in Washington. He brought with him the
Iranian proposal which had been already faxed to the State
Department on May 4th. Guldimann wanted to personally brief
State Department officials. According to Guldimann's memos,
the affair was extremely confidential: 2
"S.
Kharazi asked me whether I could present the enclosed
roadmap very confidentially to someone very high in the DoS
in order to know the US reaction to it. He said that the
lack of trust with the US imposes them to proceed very
carefully and very confidentially. After discussing this
problem with him, I understood that they want to be sure
that if the initiative failed and if anything about the new
Iranian flexibility became known, they would also for
internal reason not to be bound to it." (emphasis mine)
The affair was apparently so covert and important, that only
four people were informed in Iran, The Supreme Leader,
President Khatami, Foreign minister Kamal Kharazi and Sadegh
Kharazi:
"Kharazi
told me that he had two long discussions with the leader on
the roadmap. In those meetings which both lasted two hours,
only president Khatami and foreign minister Kamal Kharazi
were present. The question is dealt with in high secrecy.
Therefore no one else has been informed."
The secrecy implied that the Revolutionary Gurads, the
National Security Council, the cabinet ministers, and the
Iranian parliament were all kept in the dark on this
historical shift in Iranian foreign policy. There was
however a fifth Iranian involved in managing the issue. This
man, so highly trusted by the Iranian regime, was Trita
Parsi, Congressman Bob Ney's assistant and president of the
then newly founded “National Iranian American Council.”
Following Kharazi’s instructions, Guldiman gave a copy of
the proposal to Bob Ney and Trita Parsi. In a long interview
with the "Democracy Now", Parsi explained this part of the
story: 5
“The
Iranians gave a proposal to the Swiss ambassador that he
then sent to the Swiss foreign ministry in Bern, who faxed
it onto the State Department, but the Swiss ambassador also
made a personal visit to Washington, D.C. to brief the State
Department about the proposal, and he also made sure that he
met with Congressman Ney, who has been a longtime advocate
for negotiations and dialogue between the United States and
Iran, and he handed him the proposal, as well.
I was an advisor to Bob Ney at the time. And Tim met with
Bob and handed over the proposal to him. And Bob afterwards
sent it to be hand-delivered to the White House to Karl
Rove, and Karl Rove called back within two hours, and they
had a brief discussion about the proposal.”
Parsi admitted that: “he was the point person for Ney in
helping to manage this issue.”8 Obviously, the Swiss
ambassador did not intend to put at risk such a historical
event by turning to Bob Ney's group. He was surely
instructed by his Iranian contacts to do so.
It is hard to explain why Iran did not use its usual channel
of diplomacy, which was leading the negotiation with the US
to send the grand bargain offer. Why Iran did not ask Javad
Zarif, one of the most skilful diplomats Iran has ever had,
to deliver the massage to his contacts in the White House
and the State Department during his May 3rd meeting in
Geneva?
Why did Iran decide to ask Bob Ney and Trita Parsi to
“manage this issue” (as Parsi stated) and send the proposal
to the White House? What could this team achieve that the
Iranian Foreign minister and other diplomats were unable to
do? Put simply, couldn't the Swiss ambassador deliver the
message directly to the White House without asking for Ney
and Parsi’s help?
In reality, the Iranian regime had entrusted Parsi and his
boss so much that when three years later, in 2006, the
situation was worsening again for the regime of Tehran,
Parsi was once again given a new (and different) copy of the
2003 offer and called upon to reconstruct the smoke screen:
9
"Parsi,
who provided the document to IPS, says he got it from an
Iranian official earlier this year but is not at liberty to
reveal the source." (Gareth Porter, IPS, May 24, 2006)
We should remember that the choice of Bob Ney’s circle was
not accidental. It was the third time in less than a year
that Ney's group was called upon by the Iranian regime for
special favors. Surely, the White House was informed about
Ney’s special relations with Tehran.
At the same time that Ney was delivering the Iranian offer
to the White House, he was also involved with two London
based felons hired by the Iranian regime. A part of Ney's
indictment (that sent him to federal prison) is related to
this affair. This story is briefly summarized as follows. 10
In 2002, the Iranian regime wanted to buy a VIP aircraft for
their officials. Restricted by US sanctions, the Iranian
defense ministry founded a company in Cypress called Safat
Air.11 Then, the Iranian company signed the purchase
contract with London based FN aviation, led by two
international felons. In order to resolve the sanctions
issue, they needed some help in the US and naturally, they
found and bribed Bob Ney. In this fiasco, his former
assistant David Diestefano and a famous Washington lobbyist
Roy Coffee also assisted Ney.
More
strangely, is the creation of Trita Parsi's organization
called the “National Iranian American Council” (NIAC) in
2002. Roy Coffee, the Washington lobbyist who was involved
in Ney’s dealings with FN Aviation, wrote a letter to the
Dallas Morning News on February 2, 2006 and declared: 12
"Back in
the spring or summer of 2002, a good friend of mine from law
school, Darius Baghai, had just returned from visiting
relatives in Iran for the first time since his family left
before the revolution. He spoke with me about how the
economy of Iran was humming and that the US was missing out
because we were the only country imposing sanctions on Iran
since 1979. .. From this, I took Darius into visit with Mr.
Ney. What was to be a 15 minute meeting became a 1 1/2 hour
meeting as they spoke passionately about their hopes for the
Iranian people. They also spoke in Farsi a great deal - I'm
sure talking smack about me. From that meeting, Darius, Dave
and I began to work with Trita Parsi, another
Iranian-American to try to form a political action committee
of Iranian-Americans to pursue a strategy of normalization
of relations between the two countries."
Is it accidental that the timing of this “grand bargain
offer,” the timing of Ney’s affair with the Iranian backed
international felons, and Ney’s group’s involvement with
Trita Parsi to create a lobbying political affairs committee
for normalizing relations between Iran and the US,
overlapped?
Is it accidental when Tehran needed to create the pretence
that they were offering an olive branch to US, they went to
Trita Parsi and Ney’s group, the same group that was helping
Tehran in removing US sanctions? What could this small group
of people achieve that the Iranian diplomats were unable to
fulfill?
Grand
bargain or buying time?
In 2003,
Mohammad Khatami was a totally powerless president. He did
not even have control on his own government, let alone
foreign policy, which was the Supreme Leader’s exclusive
domain. Was the Khatami government mandated by the Supreme
Leader to negotiate with the US to settle the problems
between the two countries? The answer is clearly and
unequivocally no. Elite members of Khatami’s government have
brought clear responses to these questions:
Mohsen Amin Zadeh, the senior Iranian deputy foreign
minister (1997-2005) 13
“Mohammad
Khatami’s government was authorized (by the Iranian ruling
power) to engage the United States about Afghanistan and
Iraq and was permitted to have some kind of collaboration on
these issues but was forbidden to negotiate the main issues
of national importance like the sanctions. There was a group
in Iran that did not want to use the opportunity created at
the time to resolve the most important problems of Iranian
foreign policy (US-Iran relation).”
The political group “Mojahedine Enghelabe Eslami,” a main
component of Iranian government in 2003 was even more
explicit: 14
“It should
be emphasized that during the reformist government
(1997-2005), the US administration was trying by different
means to open a dialogue with Iran. But, on our side, there
were some groups in Iran, which did not give the permission
to Khatami’s government to take effective steps in this
direction”
More illuminating, is Sdegh Kharazi’s own declarations. He
is the initiator of the 2003 offer. He admitted that the
conditions were not ready for any kind of bargain. He gave a
long interview to Etemad newspaper on February 2, 2007 of
which an excerpt is below.
Question:
Why was the opportunity to normalize the relations with the
US lost under Khatami (1997-2005)?
Kharazi:
Khatami was not given the permission to proceed in this
direction. Some initiatives were launched to dissipate the
mistrust between the two countries but did not advance. The
conditions for a dialogue were not ready in Iran and in the
US.
In an interview to the Iranian press, Sadegh Kharazi was
clear about the Iranian regime’s goal in sending the grand
bargain offer, which was to neutralize an American military
strike: 15
“In 2003
there was a wall of mistrust between Iran and the US and
they could attack us at any moment. Therefore, the
government accepted my suggestion and sent a conciliatory
letter to the US administration.”
Was Iran seeking a settlement with the US or just looking to
reduce the tensions and overcome a critical and dangerous
situation in 2003? During a public debate in November 2006,
Hamid Reza Taraghi, the head of “Heiate Motalefe”, one of
Iran’s main conservative groups declared: 16
“After
9/11 and its consequences, we were very worried and a group
of the deputies met with the Supreme leader and explained
the root of their fear. We reached the conclusion that Iran
was facing a real threat and we could be occupied as it
happened in 1941.
We asked the Leader to be more moderate toward the US. He
accepted our view and through the government and other
officials, wisely and successfully managed that dangerous
time”
The best way to understand the Iranian goals in 2003 is to
see its policy over the nuclear issue, which was on the
verge of being referred to the UN. Pressured, Iran decided
to suspend its Uranium enrichment.
Was Iran seeking to resolve the dispute over its nuclear
program or was it trying to pass the storm and buy time? The
answer given by the Iranian chief negotiator at that time is
clear and unequivocal: “Buying time to complete those parts
of the program which needed to be improved”. In a recent
speech, Hassan Rohani defended the regime’s decision to cede
to European pressure in 2003 and suspend uranium enrichment:
17
“During the period that we suspended the enrichment, we
built the centrifuges, built the Arak center and as a whole,
we completed every aspect of the program, which was
incomplete. The West wanted that we suspend the enrichment
to stop our program but we suspended it to be able to
improve our program. By suspending, we were able to pass the
danger and at the same time, strengthen our program.”
The readers can also watch a video from the Iranian
negotiator in 2003, Hossein Mousavian, who with astonishing
clarity explains how: “the negotiations with the European
Troika helped Iran to buy time to complete the Esphahan UCF
project and also the work on centrifuges in Natanz.” 17
The 2003
Offer Was Part of a Broader Misinformation Campaign
The 2003
offer had the immediate goal of disarming and undermining
potential American action against Iran. This offer also was
a major element of an unprecedented misinformation campaign
to disguise the nature of the Iranian regime and its
intentions. The campaign was high priority for Tehran at a
time when the Iranian power structure was experiencing a
fundamental transformation towards Ahmadinejad's era.
Iran never intended to conduct serious negotiations with the
US to settle problems. As seen with the “Iranian Grand
Bargain,” Tehran preferred the Swiss ambassador to its own
negotiating team. Iran also made sure that its friends in
Washington (Ney's circle) would be involved in the delivery
of the blueprint. This inclusion could guarantee that any
time in the future that US administration would decide to be
harsh on Iran; the friends would come forward and tell the
public the story of US failure and Iranian flexibility.
This
scenario was exactly what happened in 2006 when the Iranian
nuclear issue was referred to the UN and there was fear of
harsh measures by the US. Then, the Iranian regime gave a
fresh copy of the offer to Trita Parsi. This goal is so
evident that even Ray Takeyh, the CFR expert and one of the
most ardent defenders of engaging the Iranian regime had to
admit: 18
“Look, to
be frank, the 2003 argument is useful if you want to beat up
on the Bush administration. If you want to go out there and
say Condi's lying and, you know, Bush administration is
censoring, if that's -- then it's useful, as a stick to beat
the Bush administration as a government, as an
administration that purposely missed a historical
opportunity to reconcile Iran and America and assure the
epoch of bliss. It's useful in that sense. I don't think
it's useful in terms of assessment of Iranian foreign policy
and where it is today.”
“Beating up” the US administration is a part of bigger
campaign to prevent any harsh policy toward the Iranian
regime. This was exactly the essence of what Trita Parsi and
his Iranian partner Siamak Namazi wrote in a joint paper in
1999: “An Iranian-American lobby is needed in order to
create a balance between the competing Middle Eastern
lobbies, set up this goal. Without it, Iran-bashing may
become popular in Congress again.” In a separate article I
have discussed the creation of this Iranian American lobby
in the US and the role of Namazi, Parsi, and Sadegh Kharazi.
19
This group has achieved one of the most formidable campaigns
to present the Iranian dictatorship as a permanently
pragmatic regime which bears no threat to the US and is
always ready for a deal. The 2003 offer has been the
foundation of this campaign.
As a result of this campaign, the gap between what Parsi and
his friends have been proposing to the American public and
what really happens in Iran is flagrant. For example, in
2006, Parsi initiated an anti-war petition signed by him and
several American organizations. After denouncing US policy
toward Iran, they declared: "The US has refused to start a
dialogue with Iran for the past 26 years” 20
We can compare Parsi's declaration with a public statement
by one of the main factions of the Iranian government from
1997 to 2005. The Mojahedine Enghelab Elami released a
statement in July of 2007 about Iran-US relations. In this
piece, the authors incriminated the Iranian leaders for the
US-Iran impasse and declared: 21
"This
question has remained unanswerd that why Iran did not
respond positively to American gestures to resolve the
problem between the two countries. While there was an ideal
condition to settle our differences with US and American
leaders took the most reconcible positions toward us and
declared that they are ready for unconditional dialogue with
us and even told that they understand some of our positions
like our opposition to the Middle East peace process, but we
did not respond to them."(emphasis mine)
In a separate paper: "Pro-Ayatollahs Disinformation and
Manipulation Campaign by Washington Think Tankers" 22 I have
discussed this extraordinary campaign of misinformation in
favor of the Iranian regime, especially in 2003-2004 when
Iran was trying to mask the rise of Ahmadinejad’s faction.
During this time, this campaign was focused on publicizing
the idea that a pragmatic faction is replacing the reformers
and this imaginary faction is aiming for a “Chinese model”
of development. Even more stunning, when the reality about
this extraordinary amalgam was becoming visible and the
mirage of the Chinese model was fading, the very people who
fabricated this mirage came back with a new suggestion, that
Iran is close to a "lite Chinese model." Interestingly, the
inventor of such a mini miracle was none other than Trita
Parsi's partner in Tehran, Siamak Namazi. I highly recommend
the readers to study Namazi's paper that is a master of
misinformation in order to see how some Iran experts in the
US have been repeating his claims. 23
The key to understanding the Iranian so-called 2003 grand
bargain offer and its impacts on US politic resides within
Trita Parsi and his former boss, Bob Ney. We know little
about the 10 years of relations between them and the Iranian
regime. What we do know is enough to ask serious questions.
On December 28, 2006, the governmental newspaper Aftab in
Iran published an interview with Trita Parsi. In his
introduction, the editor underlined the role of Iranian
lobby in US and considered it as its “unofficial diplomacy.”
Next to Parsi’s photo, the article’s title reads: “The
Iranian Lobby Becomes Active?” A translation of parts of the
article is as follows: 24
“The conflict between Iran and the West on Iran’s nuclear
file has entered a critical state. The government must now
utilize all the possible resources to defend the national
interest. In this, we have not paid enough attention to the
potentially significant influence of the Iranian American
society in moderating the extremist policies of the White
House. In comparison of this untouched potential to the
influence of the Jewish lobby in directing the policies of
Washington in supporting Israel, we see the difference
between what is and what could be. The role of unofficial
diplomacy has been correctly underlined by experts”
(emphasis mine)
Another
governmental commentator was more explicit about how this
“unofficial diplomacy” could “moderate” the policies of the
White House: 25
“We have
successfully aligned the public opinion of Middle Eastern
and Latin American counties to our cause but have not
attracted the public opinion in the Western countries, where
it could affect the governmental policies toward Iran.
Aligning
the Western public opinion to our side could be greatly
helpful to our national security. For example, anti-war
demonstrations or the opposition by public opinion or
political parties against the economic sanctions against our
country is a winning card in the hand of our foreign policy
planners.”
The 2003 grand bargain could only be viewed as a part of the
Iranian regime’s unofficial diplomacy, in harmony with its
general foreign policy.
REFERENCES
1- Glenn
Kessler, Washington Post Feb. 14, 2007 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021301363.html
2- A copy of Iranian offer by Washington Post: http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/us_iran_roadmap.pdf
3- Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, April 2007 http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/
4- Gareth Porter, IPS, May 24, 2006: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33348
5- Trita Parsi's interview with Democracy Now, Feb. 26,
2007: http://www.democracynow.org/2007/2/26/ex_congressional_aide_karl_rove_personally
6- The Grand Bargain, American Iranian Council: http://www.american-iranian.org/pubs/articles/The_Grand_Bargain_April-May_2007.pdf
7- The Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report on
Iran 2004, (p. 29) http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iran_TF.pdf
8- Steve Clemons, Feb. 17, 2007: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-clemons/what-did-rove-do-with-200_b_41472.html
9- Gareth Porter, May 25, 2006: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0525-05.htm
10- DOJ on Bob Ney: http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/January/07_crm_027.html
For a complete story go to http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Bob_Ney
11- The VIP airplane and role of FN Aviation reported by
Iranian Press: http://baztab.com/news/24835.php also: Times
of London: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article2576175.ece
12- Roy Coffee's letter: http://frontburner.dmagazine.com/archives/013069.html
13- Nameh magazine # 49, March 2006
14- A review of Iranian diplomacy under Ahmadinejad, Asre No
reprinted by Rooze, March21, 2007 http://emruz.info/ShowItem.aspx?ID=6047&p=1
15- Asre Iran and Raja News Feb. 20, 2007 http://www.asriran.com/view.php?id=12170
16- March 22, 2007 Emrooz news web site from the "Goftegoo"
Radio station, broadcast on Jan, 31, 2007
17- 11.21.2007 Aftab News http://www.aftabnews.ir/vdchzqn23vnq-.html.
Also watch an interview by Hossein Moussavian http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/805.htm
18- Ray Takeyh, Time for detent with Iran, CFR, Feb. 22,
2007 http://www.cfr.org/publication/12718/time_for_detente_with_iran.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F112%2Fgideon_rose
19- Iran’s oil Mafia, FrontPage Magazine April 16, 2007
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=B30E945B-5F1F-4A57-A7AA-F4975D12FC4C
20- http://www.downsizedc.org/blog/2007/mar/08/no_war_with_iran_coalition
21- Mojahedine Enghelabe Eslami, Asre No, Published by
Emrooz, Auguste 16. 2007 http://emruz.biz/ShowItem.aspx?ID=9194&p=1
22- Pro-Ayatollahs Disinformation and Manipulation Campaign
by Washington Think Tankers, Auguste 1, 2007 http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=33939
23- Siamak Namazi, What happened to the Chinese model,
Wilson Center Nov. 16, 2004: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=95452
you can read a copy of his speech at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/SiamakNamaziFinal.pdf
24- Aftab, Dec. 28, 2006: http://www.aftabnews.ir/vdccpoq2biqpp.html
25- Shargh newspaper, Nabiollah Ebrahimi, republished by
Aftab July, 7, 2007: http://www.aftab.ir/articles/politics/iran/c1c1183822467p1.php
Source:
Global Politician
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