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Why Did Larijani Resign?
Iran buys
more time.
National Review
October 22, 2007 7:00 AM
By Michael Ledeen
The mullahologists are all atwitter over the “meaning” of
the surprise resignation of one of Iran’s most public
officials, chief nuclear negotiator and national-security
council chief Ali Larijani.
It must mean something, mustn’t it? This is a major figure
in the Islamic Republic, who has long harbored presidential
ambitions, and has played a key role in some of the regime’s
most important policies. He was minister of culture, then
head of state broadcasting, then secretary of the Supreme
National Security Council. If such a powerful figure steps
down from his position, it must be viewed as a significant
event. But what?
Most of the folks who read Iranian tea leaves describe him
as an intimate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and a critic
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With their usual tendency
to project Western political models on foreign lands, most
commentators have interpreted Larijani’s resignation as a
defeat for him, a big win for Ahmadinejad, and an indication
that Khamenei has swung around to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
approach to the nuclear question. Thus, al-AP
describes
Larijani’s departure as “a victory for the hardline
president that could push the country into an even more
defiant position in its standoff with the West,” because,
after all, “Ali Larijani was viewed as more moderate than
Ahmadinejad and the two often clashed over how to negotiate
with the world on the nuclear issue.” And al-Reuters
quotes an
unnamed source to the effect that Larijani had been put in a
strait jacket by Ahmadinejad. "The president left no more
room for Larijani to maneuver and negotiate."
If that is right, then it’s passing odd that Larijani will
remain as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the Supreme
National Security Council, and participate in the meetings
of Khamenei’s inner circle. One would not be inclined to
call that a crushing defeat. Moreover, EU sources reported
that Larijani will be part of the Iranian negotiating team
that will meet Tuesday with Europe’s foreign minister,
Javier Solana. So that straitjacket isn’t all that tight, is
it?
Whatever Larijani’s job change may mean, it doesn’t
represent a change in policy. The differences between
Larijani and Ahmadinejad were only tactical. On the basic
question — should Iran suspend its enrichment program — you
couldn’t get the tip of a scimitar between the two. Both
said repeatedly — as they had to, since the Supreme Leader
had laid down the law — that Iran would never abandon
enrichment. Theirs was a debate over style. Ahmadinejad
wanted to tell the West to go to hell, while Larijani
charmed them. Indeed, Larijani was the West’s favorite
interlocutor. From EU Solana to a parade of foreign
ministers and secret back channels (including Secretary of
State Rice’s personal emissary, former Spanish President
Felipe Gonzales), Larijani was universally liked. To be
sure, he never gave a centimeter, but he was popular. I
suppose President Bush would consider him “a good guy,” in
the mold of, say, Vladimir Putin.
No doubt Larijani and Ahmadinejad don’t love one another,
and their more or less public spat has been going on for
quite a while. The ruling class of the Islamic Republic is
in the throes of a succession struggle, as Khamenei
continues to defy the prediction of his doctors that he
would die several months ago, and Larijani and Ahmadinejad,
along with other celebrities such as former President
Hashemi Rafsanjani, are major players in that battle, as
John Bolton observed on Sunday.
The personnel shift may also be related to the mysterious
meeting between Khamenei and Putin a few days ago, about
which very little has become public. I am told, in fact,
that the Russian president memorized his key message in
Farsi, and delivered it in a private meeting with the
Supreme Leader, with not even an interpreter present. If you
think that is a foolish way to conduct diplomacy, I’m
inclined to agree, but then I’m not a former high official
of the KGB. Perhaps Putin made some interesting proposal
that requires the talents of a Larijani. In that case,
Larijani would need more time to devote to the Putin
project. It’s not as if his successor at the Supreme
National Security Council is a dominant figure in the
Iranian political world. Indeed the new guy is generally
considered a nobody, which further reinforces the view that
we are not witnessing a fundamental political shift in
Tehran.
Most likely, in fact, the explanation of Larijani’s
departure is fairly mundane: It’s just another in a long
series of Iranian maneuvers to buy still more time to pursue
their nuclear project, and stave off a new round of
sanctions. If the beloved Larijani is moving on, it will
take time for the new guy, Saeed Jalili, a diplomat in the
foreign ministry, to master his job, and Western governments
can be expected to extend him the courtesy of a warm-up. As
the Iranians see it, a month saved is a month earned.
The main point is that we still have no Iran policy. Maybe
we should offer Larijani a nice job in Foggy Bottom.
—
Michael Ledeen, an NRO contributing editor, is resident
scholar in the Freedom Chair at the
American Enterprise Institute
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